Base bibliográfica geral
Registos: 1 - 6 de um total de 6
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Título: Towards a single capital markets supervisor in the EU : the proposed extension of ESMA’S supervisory powers
Autor(es): Katerina Lagaria
Notas: Bibliografia pág. 59-61
Resumo: 1. Introduction. 2. ESMA’s existing mandate. 2.1 ESMA’s responsibilities and objectives. 2.2 ESMA’s existing direct supervisory powers. 2.3 The supervisory state of affairs under the Capital Markets Union and Banking Union agendas. 3. The case for centralised supervision of EU capital markets. 3.1 The proposed extension of ESMA’s powers under the CMU agenda. 3.2 Objections to a single capital markets supervisor. 4. Potential drivers behind the proposed shift towards centralised supervision of EU capital markets. 4.1 Some theoretical background. 4.2 Exogenous factors. 4.3 Endogenous factors. 5. Concluding remarks
Publicado em: In: Revista de concorrência e regulação. - Coimbra : Almedina. - A. 9, n.º 33-34 (jan.-jun. 2018), p. 39-61
Assuntos: Direito comunitário | Supervisão | Direito financeiro | Regulação financeira
Veja também: Lagaria, Katerina
Localização: PP.270 (CEJ)

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Título: Strengthening the governance of national financial supervision in the EU : existing weaknesses and a proposal for reform
Autor(es): Christopher P. Buttigieg
Resumo: The paper is a contribution to the debate on the governance of financial supervision in Europe. It analyses the: [i] rationale for delegation of regulatory and supervisory powers to an independent supervisor; [ii] governance arrangements for independence and accountability of supervision; and [iii] institutional models for supervision at national level. The paper also examines the extent of the independence and supervisory capacity of national supervisors in Europe by reference to the financial sector assessment programme reports published by the International Monetary Fund and identifies the main weaknesses in the governance of financial supervisors, which also have a negative impact on supervision on a European scale. The paper makes recommendations for a mechanism to address these weaknesses
Publicado em: In: ERA Forum. - Trier. - V. 15, n.º 2 (jul. 2014), p. 197-227
Assuntos: Direito comunitário | Fiscalização da legalidade | Regulação | Supervisão
Veja também: Buttigieg, Christopher P.
Localização: PP.249 (CEJ)

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Título: O modelo de supervisão de tratamentos de dados pessoais na União Europeia: da atual diretiva ao futuro regulamento
Autor(es): Filipa Calvão
Resumo: 1.A supervisão dos tratamentos de dados pessoais na União Europeia e em Portugal: regime atual. 2. O modelo de supervisão dos tratamentos de dados pessoais em projeto. 3. Conclusões
Publicado em: In: Forum de proteção de dados. - Lisboa : Comissão Nacional de Protecção de Dados. - ISSN 2183-5977. - N.º 01 (julho 2015), p. 34-46
Assuntos: Tratamento de dados pessoais | Regulamento | Supervisão | União Europeia
Veja também: Calvão, Filipa Urbano
Localização: PP.300 (CEJ)

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Título: Leading the way through : the role of the european central bank as pendulum, shield and supervisor of the euro area
Autor(es): Álvaro Silveira de Meneses
Notas: Bibliografia pág. 150-152
Resumo: In 2012, in a conference in London, Mário Draghi claimed "the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. Believe me, it will be enough", as he announced the Bank was ready to intervene by entering the market and steadily buying sovereign bonds. The "whatever it takes" policy was a drastic shift in ECB policy, thus bringing measures with sizable results, such as the Outright Monetary Transactions Program. However, questions were asked and complex policy options were at stake, namely in what concerns the dynamics and interaction of several European Institutions and the Member States. This article presents the major issues that surrounded the introduction of the Outright Monetary Transactions Program and gives an overview of the European Court of Justice’s decision that backed the unconventional use of powers by the European Central Bank, defending an important tool in safeguarding the stability of the Eurozone
Publicado em: In: Revista de concorrência e regulação. - Coimbra : Almedina. - A. 8, n.º 29 (jan.-mar. 2017), p. 139-152
Assuntos: Direito comunitário | Banco Central Europeu | Supervisão
Veja também: Meneses, Álvaro Silveira de
Localização: PP.270 (CEJ)

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Título: Designing financial supervision institutions : independence, accountability and governance
Autor(es): edited by Donato Masciandaro, Marc Quintyn
Publicação: Cheltenham : Edward Elgar, 2007
Descrição física: XXVI, 504 p. ; 25 cm
Resumo: Foreword / Donato Masciandaro and Marc Quintyn. Introduction / Charles Goodhart. PART I: INDEPENDENCE, ACCOUNTABILITY AND GOVERNANCE. 1. Robust Regulators and their Political Masters: Independence and Accountability in Theory / Marc Quintyn and Michael W. Taylor. 2. Independence and Accountability in Supervision: General Principles and European Setting / Lorenzo Bini Smaghi. 3. The Fear of Freedom: Politicians and the Independence and Accountability of Financial Supervisors in Practice / Marc Quintyn, Silvia Ramirez and Michael W. Taylor. 4. Independence and Accountability: Why Politics Matters / Jonathan Westrup. 5. Governance in Banking Supervision: Theory and Practices / Marco Arnone, Salim M. Darbar and Alessandro Gambini. PART II: THE DESIGN OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: CAUSES AND EFFECTS. 6. Financial Supervision Architecture and Central Bank Independence /Andreas Freytag and Donato Masciandaro. 7. Architectures of Supervisory Authorities and Banking Supervision / Marco Arnone and Alessandro Gambini. 8. Experience with Integrated Supervisors: Governance and Quality of Supervision / Martin Cihák and Richard Podpiera. 9. Financial Supervisors: Alternative Models / Giorgio Di Giorgio and Carmine Di Noia. 10. Budgetary Governance of Banking Supervision: A Primer / Donato Masciandaro, Maria Nieto and Henriëtte Prast. PART III: IN SEARCH OF THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS. 11. Bureaucrats or Politicians? / Alberto Alesina and Guido Tabellini. 12. Agency Problems in Banking Supervision / Robert A. Eisenbeis
ISBN/ISSN: ISBN 978-1-84720-216-1
Assuntos: Direito bancário | Instituição financeira | Banco | Supervisão
CDU: 347.734
Veja também: Masciandaro, Donato | Quintyn, Marc
Localização: DNI.65 (CEJ) - 30000029138


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Título: Central Bank independence revisited
Autor(es): Yves Mersch
Resumo: The paper examines the degree and extent of independence which the European Central Bank is granted by the primary and secondary law in its different roles as guarantor of price stability, as crisis manager and as financial market supervisor
Publicado em: In: ERA Forum. - Trier. - V. 18, n.º 4 (junho 2018), p. 627-645
Assuntos: Banco Central Europeu | Independência | Crise financeira | Supervisão
Veja também: Mersch, Yves
Localização: PP.249 (CEJ)