100   ^a20160719d2016    k  y0porb0103    ba
101 0 ^apor
102   ^aPT
200 1 ^a<The >extended mind and the computational basis of responsibility ascription^fAndreas Matthias
330   ^aIntroduction. I. Making sense of the Extended Mind Thesis: 1. The original Extended Mind Thesis: 1.1. Otto's notebook; 1.2. Playing tetris and epistemic actions; 1.3. Seven different versions of the claim: a) Causal coupling; b) Epistemic actions; c) Use of external computing resources; d) Extended beliefs; f) Extended mental states; g) Spread selves; 2. Problems of the Extended Mind Thesis: 2.1. The coupling-constitution fallacy; 2.2. Extended cognition thesis and extended cognitive system thesis; 2.3. What is the "mark of the cognitive"?; 2.4. Side-stepping the problem; 2.5. Cognitive equivalence; 3. Three basic claims of cognitive externalism; 4. Cognitive procedures and cognitive data; 5. Can we reliably distinguish procedures from data? II. Computational coupling and responsibility ascription: 1. Extended minds and extended agents; 2. Attributing epistemic credit; 3. Symmetrical coupling of Computational hybrids and responsibility ascription: 3.1. The epistemic disadvantage of humans; 4. The "human in the loop" fallacy. III. Conclusion: The Extended Mind Thesis, Computational coupling, and human responsibility
461  1^tAnatomia do crime^cCoimbra^bAlmedina^vN.º 3 (jan.-jun. 2016)^pp. 129-153
606   ^aAnatomia do crime
606   ^aInteligência artificial
606   ^aAgentes autónomos
606   ^aResponsabilidade
700  1^aMatthias,^bAndreas
920 n
921 a
922 a
923  
924  
925  
931 20160719
932 d
933 2016
934     
935 k  
936 y
937 0
938 ba