100   ^a20110426d2010    k  y0porb0103    ba
101 0 ^apor
102   ^aPT
200 1 ^a<The >relationship between the leniency programme and private actions for damages at the EU level^fAlberto Saavedra
330   ^aThe aim of this article is to assess the complementarity and interrelationship between public and private enforcement, on the on hand, and to discuss the several policy options put forward by the Commission that aim to find balance between the leniency programme and actios for damages, on the other hand. Our thesis is that the appropriate balance is obtained by limiting the incentives in the context of private enforcement only to the successful immunity applicant as a price for his contribution in the uncovering of a cartel and the need to preserve the attractiveness of the leniency programme. The incentives can be translated in terms of non-disclosure of evidence provided to the competition authority and limited liability. By contrast, all other cartelists and leniency applicants which only benefit from reduction shall not have any rewards when facing civil claims. The central role of role of the immunity applicant will provide the key to approach some of the problems that arise from the interrelation between leniency applications and damages claims, such as (i) the question on whether the enhancement of private actions as such will weaken the leniency mechanism and (ii) how a certain degree of protection can be guaranteed to the leniency applicant, in particular by discussing the various policies that limit the scope of the civil liability of the successful leniency applicant proposed by the Comission. 
461  1^tRevista de concorrência e regulação^cCoimbra^bAlmedina^d2010^x1647-5801^pp. 21-51^vA. 1, Nº 4 (Out.-Dez. 2010)
606   ^aDireito da concorrência
606   ^aAutoridade da concorrência
606   ^aAutoridade reguladora
606   ^aUnião Europeia
700  1^aSaavedra,^bAlberto
920 n
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966   ^lCEJ^sPP.270^120110426